| 1  | M248AVEF  | ocument 393 Thea 02           | 2/00/22 Fage 1 0/ 34 1016                       |
|----|---|-------------------------------|---|
| 1  | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  |                               |   |
| 2  | SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW  |                               |   |
| 3  | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  | .,                            |   |
| 4  | v.  |                               | 19 Cr. 374 (JMF)                                |
| 5  | MICHAEL AVENATTI,   |                               |   |
| 6  | Defendant   |                               | Trial   |
| 7  |   | x                             | IIIdI   |
| 8  |   |                               | New York, N.Y.<br>February 4, 2022<br>9:00 a.m. |
| 10 | Before:   |                               |   |
| 11 |   |                               |   |
| 12 | HON. JESSE M. FURMAN,   |                               |   |
| 13 |   |                               | District Judge<br>-and a Jury-                  |
| 14 |   | APPEARANCES                   |   |
| 15 | DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the                                |                               |   |
| 16 | Southern District o BY: MATTHEW D. PODOLSKY                                   | of New York                   |   |
| 17 | ROBERT B. SOBELMAN ANDREW A. ROHRBACH   |                               |   |
| 18 |   |                               |   |
| 19 | MICHAEL AVENATTI, Defendant Pro Se  |                               |   |
| 20 | DAVID E. PATTON   |                               |   |
| 21 | Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. Attorney for Defendant BY: ROBERT M. BAUM |                               |   |
| 22 | ANDREW J. DALACK<br>TAMARA L. GIWA  |                               |   |
| 23 | Standby Assistant Federal Defenders   |                               |   |
| 24 | <del>-</del>  | gent DeLeassa Perney's Office | enland  |
| 25 | Christoph   | =                             | Paralegal Specialist                            |

1 (Trial resumed; jury not present)

THE COURT: Good morning. Welcome back.

The government is present. Mr. Avenatti is present. Standby counsel is present.

As you, I think, know, we have received a third jury note. I will mark it Court Exhibit 3. It reads as follows:

"We have one juror who is refusing to look at evidence and is acting on a feeling. We need assistance on moving forward. She does not believe she needs to prove her side using evidence and refuses to show us how she has come to her conclusion. Please — underlined — help us move forward. Not going on any evidence, all emotions and does not understand this job of a jury."

Dated today, February 4, at 10:02 a.m.

I provided, through my deputy, a potential response for your consideration. I am certainly open to alternative suggestions. I am not wedded to this.

Government.

MR. PODOLSKY: Yes, your Honor.

First I will say, and I am happy to go through it, but I think there has now been an extensive record, and particularly based on this last note, that there is a juror who is not deliberating. What we would suggest in lieu of an instruction, particularly given the strength of this last note, the similarities to what happened in <code>Baker</code>, and the underlined

request for assistance, would be to send back a note to the jury, consistent with <code>Baker</code>, ask the foreperson to identify the juror, to confirm that the note that was sent was on behalf of the other 11 deliberating jurors, and in the meanwhile we could discuss and consider what further inquiry, if any, should be made of that juror, or other jurors, what form that might take, and then ultimately whether the juror should be excused for refusing to deliberate, which <code>Baker</code> and other cases make clear is well within <code>Court's</code> discretion, and, frankly, should happen when a juror refuses to deliberate.

THE COURT: I guess, initial reaction, and then I will hear again from you and then from Mr. Avenatti.

I am disinclined to only do that. One possibility is giving some version of this instruction, which underscores the duty to deliberate requires consideration of the evidence, and the jurors should not let themselves be swayed by sympathy or emotion. That directly responds to the note and perhaps would do the trick.

I suppose one possibility is to give some version of this instruction and say, if, after continuing to deliberate, you continue to have this problem, please let us know, confirm this is on behalf of 11 of the 12 of you, and please identify the juror in question. I guess I am disinclined to do that now. Reading *Baker*, you are certainly correct that the court handled it that way, but it did so after receiving three notes

with respect to this issue. Here, we have only one. Granted, we have yesterday's note indicating that they couldn't reach a consensus, but we don't know if that was the same lineup and same situation or not, and it was quite early in the jury's deliberations.

So I guess I am a little bit reluctant to ask them to name names immediately, on the theory that we don't know a whole lot yet and that that would really sort of put the screws, so to speak, on the one juror, and without knowing more, whether it's a refusal to deliberate, as the note suggests, versus a conscientious belief that the evidence supports the conclusion that she has reached, that we should be a little hesitant to do more than what I am proposing.

MR. PODOLSKY: If I may, your Honor.

Let me analogize it to Baker. In Baker, there was a note received within a few hours of the beginning of deliberations. It is true that that note referenced that one juror has a feeling and refuses to deliberate, but I think there is an analogy here in a way that is quite unusual. Within only a few hours of the beginning of deliberations, the jurors expressed an inability to reach consensus. Following that, the jurors asked a legal question, which we have discussed, and they asked for a transcript in evidence. Within an hour this morning, approximately, this note came, which I think strongly indicates that that juror was refusing to look

at the 300 pages of evidence that were provided. And, most importantly, the note that was sent this morning, as I read it, is stronger than anything that was said in *Baker*, and it is very clear and doesn't admit really any other interpretation than that this juror is refusing to deliberate.

So we do think following <code>Baker</code> it would be appropriate to have an inquiry here. And, in particular — and if we end up going the route of an instruction, I am happy to talk about that in a moment — my concern generally in just instructing them is somewhat analogous to yesterday. What I would fear is jurors, frankly, pleading for help, with an underlined "please," and then receiving simply an instruction, and then feeling like there is no help, when help is available if a juror is refusing to deliberate.

THE COURT: I am not sure I agree with the assertion that this is a stronger letter than in *Baker*. Again, there were three notes in *Baker* — not letter — three notes in *Baker*, and they were pretty strongly worded there. So I am not sure that's accurate.

Mr. Avenatti, your views, please.

MR. AVENATTI: Yes, your Honor. Good morning.

A few points. Number one, your Honor, I object to any further instructions of the jury at this time. It is obvious that the jury is deadlocked, and I am requesting that the Court declare a mistrial, and I would like to explain why.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Your Honor, this note cannot be read in isolation. Ιt has to be read in conjunction with the other notes that have been received by the Court over the last two days. We are in the third day of jury deliberations at this point, as the Court is well aware. This note does not say that this juror has refused to deliberate. Obviously, this is the first we are hearing of the complaints contained in the note. We can infer that this juror in fact did deliberate on Wednesday and Thursday. There were no complaints made relating to this juror at any point in time prior to this morning. We can also infer that this juror obviously has deliberated for two days now, and she has reached a conclusion. She doesn't have to explain that conclusion to anyone. She doesn't have to justify that conclusion to any other juror. She, like the other jurors, reviewed the evidence and the testimony during the trial, and again, all indications are that she was cooperative and deliberated for at least two days. There is no basis to remove There is no basis to try to coerce the juror. the juror. There is no basis to try to single out this juror.

This is nothing like the situation in *Baker*. In *Baker*, it was clear that the juror was refusing to deliberate, and, in fact, had made up his or her mind before deliberations even began. There is no evidence in this situation that this juror did anything like the juror in *Baker*. This jury gave a note to the Court yesterday morning stating that they could not

reach a consensus as to Count One. Your Honor gave a significant modified Allen charge. That charge included the following language at lines 14 through 17: "At the same time, no juror should surrender his or her honest conviction as to the weight or the effect of the evidence to his fellow or her fellow jurors or for the purpose of returning a verdict; it is your right to fail to agree if your honest conviction requires it."

Your Honor, all indications are that this juror did exactly what you instructed. This juror exercised that very right that you told this juror she had. But she is unwilling to change her position. That is not grounds to attempt to coerce this juror, question the juror, single out the juror. It just simply is not. And for those reasons, I am requesting a mistrial. And I would like to cite the Court to a case decided by Judge McMahon, U.S. v. Samet, S-A-M-E-T, 207 F.Supp. 269. In that decision, Judge McMahon decided that a mistrial rather than a potential dismissal of a juror was required.

I would also like to bring to the Court's attention that this juror may decline to deliberate further, although there is no indication that that's actually happening, for perfectly appropriate reasons, including being threatened, a feeling of coercion, or any number of other reasons. In fact, there is an 11th Circuit case, *U.S. v. Brown*, that decided that it's not proper to strike a juror because the juror has reached

a decision based on religious grounds.

So the idea that somehow this juror, again, has to justify her position to the other jurors, and that her failure to do so somehow constitutes improper conduct, or misconduct, or a failure to deliberate, is without merit, your Honor. This jury has been at this now for, we are on day three. It is obvious this jury is deadlocked. Any further instruction to the jury would constitute coercion and be improper. For each of those reasons, your Honor, I am requesting that the Court declare a mistrial.

THE COURT: Can you repeat the cite to Samet, please, just since I would like to look at it, and I will get back to you.

MR. AVENATTI: 207 F.Supp. 269. I can try to get a year. Perhaps Mr. Dalack can be so kind as to give us a year.

THE COURT: Assuming the citation is accurate, I don't think we need the year.

MR. AVENATTI: 2002 case, your Honor.

Your Honor, one moment, please.

Your Honor, that's my position at this time.

Depending on what the Court does next, obviously I would like to be heard further, but I am going to leave it there for now.

THE COURT: I would like to just look at *Samet* before I respond. So I am trying to get it, but bear with me.

(Pause)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: That application is denied. I don't think we are anywhere near having to declare a mistrial. I do read this note to suggest that there is a juror who is refusing to deliberate. It doesn't suggest in any way, shape or form to me that this juror holds a conscientious belief based on the To the contrary, it states explicitly that the juror evidence. is refusing to look at the evidence and acting on a feeling, that it's all emotions and so forth. So it seems to me that this implicates squarely the circumstances in Baker, Thomas, and the like. For the reasons I stated earlier, I am not inclined at this point to go the Baker route of asking the jury to identify who the juror is, but I think a more deliberate and incremental approach is more appropriate. We may get there, and if we get there, we may learn that this juror's views are rooted in evidence and it's simply a different way of looking at it, in which case we might be in mistrial territory, but I don't think we are there yet.

So let's turn to my proposal and your suggestions for amending or changing or substituting something else.

Mr. Podolsky.

MR. PODOLSKY: We have no objection to the content of the instruction, but we do think it would be appropriate, given the content of the letter, to add at the end something to the effect of, if a juror continues to refuse to deliberate in a manner that I have described, you may provide me with a further

note. We could either tell them to identify the juror or not at this point, but I think it should be clear to the jury that they are able to have further discussion with the Court on this matter, if necessary, rather than walk away with the impression that there is nothing to do other than read the instruction back to them.

THE COURT: OK. Hang on one second.

All right. I am inclined to think that makes sense, but obviously I will give Mr. Avenatti an opportunity to be heard.

I also had a few other minor tweaks to what I would propose. So what I am going to do is actually ask Ms. Smallman to print a redline that shows the edits that I have made for both sides, and then we can use that as the basis for our discussion.

MR. AVENATTI: Could I be heard because my request is different than your proposed instruction?

THE COURT: Sure. While we are waiting for the printing, sure, go ahead.

MR. AVENATTI: Thank you, your Honor.

In light of your Honor's denial, the request that I would make in the alternative is that the Court simply bring the jurors up and reread to the jurors lines 6 through 18 of the original charge under duty to deliberate. Nothing more -- well, actually, with one addition, which is a

reiteration of the burden of proof and reasonable doubt. And the reason for that is, your Honor, because this note seems to suggest that the jury may be operating under a misunderstanding relating to the fact of what my burden is in this case, which is zero. So that is my first request in the alternative.

The second request, or my second alternative request, if the Court is not willing to do that --

THE COURT: Let me ask you, do you think there is anything in my instructions that is an inaccurate statement?

95 percent of them are drawn from my original charge, and I think the other 5 percent are almost verbatim out of *Baker*. So is there anything that you think is legally wrong or inaccurate or prejudicial about this?

MR. AVENATTI: Yes.

Lines 11 through 13, your Honor, are highly prejudicial, and appears to be an effort to convince potentially a hold-out juror for acquittal that she should change her vote to convict.

THE COURT: Is it your position that the juror should let sympathy or emotion interfere with clear thinking? Because I don't think that's the law, and indeed, it's inconsistent with the instructions that I have already given to the jury, which state almost verbatim exactly that.

MR. AVENATTI: Then why is it necessary to emphasize this again, your Honor? It's not necessary at all. There are

| a number of things in the original charge that I would like the |
|---|
| Court to reemphasize, especially at this sensitive time. I      |
| doubt the Court will entertain that. So again, putting this     |
| language in this charge at this                                 |

THE COURT: Mr. Avenatti, the reason is it is directly responsive to a note. And you seem to be operating on the assumption that the one hold-out is holding out for acquittal. I don't know that to be the case. For all I know, 11 jurors are in favor of acquittal and the one who is allegedly being swayed by emotion is in favor of conviction. So I don't think that the premise of your objection is even accurate. I think it is accurate to tell the jury, and directly responsive to their note, to say that the duty to deliberate requires you to consider the evidence; it requires you not to be swayed by emotion, it requires you not to be swayed by sympathy. That is both a repetition of what I have already instructed them. It's also an accurate statement of the law.

MR. AVENATTI: Your Honor, then I would ask that the Court reread the "bias or sympathy as a juror" instruction in its entirety, together with the "duty to deliberate" instruction. So pages 33 and 34, your Honor.

THE COURT: But that's not responsive to the note. My question again, is there anything legally inaccurate or prejudicial about the draft instruction that I have given you?

Ms. Smallman, did you print the redline version?

MR. AVENATTI: Can I have a moment to confer with my advisory counsel, please?

THE COURT: You may.

(Defense counsel confer)

THE COURT: All right. Can we proceed? It's been an hour and a half since the jury sent this note. I recognize that much of that time was spent with me trying to consider the right approach in drafting something, but I also do want to respond to the note and respond to it before the jury takes its lunch.

Let me say two things, just by way of making more of a record on the mistrial application.

First of all, Samet is F.Supp.2d, just for the record.

I wanted to clarify that.

Second, Mr. Avenatti referenced that this is the third day of jury deliberations. That's technically correct, but in actual fact, the jury I don't think has deliberated much more than a day and a half at most. Yesterday was a full day of deliberations, but the jury deliberated for two hours and ten minutes on Wednesday when they got the case, and had deliberated for only an hour when we received this note. So it really amounts to about a day and a half. Moreover, they don't deliberate when they have lunch because their social distancing doesn't permit them to do so. So in that regard, to suggest that we are three days into deliberations is not an accurate

statement of where we are.

With that, let's turn to my proposal, and I am happy to take suggestions. To the extent that you think it is an inaccurate statement of the law, first of all, that would surprise me since it comes, again, almost verbatim from my original instructions. You can certainly make a record on that, and if you think it's prejudicial in some way, you can make a record on that.

Government.

MR. PODOLSKY: No, your Honor. We think this is accurate. The only thing we might suggest, if the Court thinks it's helpful, is to provide them with a written version to accompany the written instructions they have.

THE COURT: Mr. Avenatti.

MR. AVENATTI: Your Honor, I have the following objections to the proposed draft response.

First of all, within the paragraph that begins at line 8 through 14, sympathy and emotion are referenced twice. I think that's undue emphasis on that particular point.

In place of this paragraph 8 through 14, I would ask that the Court use the original charge paragraph at lines 7 through 10 on page 33. For the record, that language reads as follows: "Indeed, under your oath as jurors, you are not be swayed by bias --"

THE COURT: Mr. Avenatti, it's in the record. You

don't need to read it. So keep going.

MR. AVENATTI: Including the last sentence, "Has the government proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt?"

I am also requesting that after that language, the following language be included: "But I must remind you that Mr. Avenatti has no burden to come forward with any evidence. The burden in this case lies entirely with the government."

THE COURT: This is after what language? What line are we in now?

MR. AVENATTI: After 14, your Honor, but my request is that 7 through 10 from the original charge be put in place of 8 through 14, and then the language that I just proposed be added. If the Court is unwilling to replace the paragraph, I am asking that this language be added.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. AVENATTI: Furthermore, your Honor, I object to the inclusion of the language in the redline, at lines 24 through 27, because it is coercive and threatening. I don't believe it's appropriate at this stage of the proceedings for the Court to include this language because it can be taken as no other way other than a threat and coercive. This jury has already demonstrated an ability to send notes when there are problems. There is nothing to suggest that that would not be done again. There is no need to suggest to them that if someone is refusing to deliberate, that they can come running

to the Court and complain to the Court about it. They sent this note this morning and I am confident that if there's any further problems, they will inform all of us at that time.

Then, lastly, I would object to this instruction going to the jury, just as I did on the other instructions, since they began their deliberations and for the same reasons. There is no need to bring yet -- yet bring further attention to this particular instruction and make it any more important than all the other instructions in the case.

If I could just have one moment, please.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Give me a moment, please.

MR. AVENATTI: I had one other request. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. AVENATTI: In the event the Court is not willing to replace the paragraph as I have requested, I would respectfully ask your Honor to include language similar to that at lines 9 and 10 of the original charge relating to the government's burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: All right. I think there are a bunch of things out there. Let me see if I can respond to all of them.

I am not going to materially change my proposal. I think it's accurate. I think it's consistent with my earlier instructions. I don't really understand Mr. Avenatti's

objection to the use of the word "sympathy." First of all, it is an accurate statement of the law. Second of all, it's consistent with my prior instructions. Third of all, the bias or sympathy charge that he requested that I add here uses the word "sympathy" I think three times, by my count. So in that regard, his requests are internally inconsistent.

I don't think that anything in this charge is coercive or -- I don't think it's coercive. I think it merely reminds them what the duty to deliberate entails and tells them to keep at it. So I think it's perfectly proper.

I am going to make a couple of changes, and I am going to accept the government's suggestion of providing a copy of this instruction, as well as the good faith instruction from yesterday, to the jury, in no small part because I want to underscore to them that they should consider all of my instructions together. So I think that that makes sense so as not to give undue weight to any of my instructions. I am happy to include the modified *Allen* charge as well, but I am open to your suggestions on that.

Here are the changes that I propose to make to the most recent version that you have there.

First, I would propose to start a new paragraph with "your verdict must be based on the evidence introduced at trial or the lack of evidence," and then add the following sentence in response to one of Mr. Avenatti's requests: "But I remind

you: The defendant has no burden to present any evidence. As I have told you many times, the burden of proof lies solely with the government."

And then at the end, where I say, "With that, I will ask you to return to the jury room to continue your deliberations," I propose adding, "I am going to give you copies of the instruction that I just read to you, as well as the instruction I read to you yesterday in response to your second note. You should consider both instructions along with all of my other instructions in reaching a verdict in this case."

Any objection from the government?

MR. PODOLSKY: Certainly no objection to the correctness of anything. I would just note, on the inclusion of another reference to the burden of proof, it has been not only multiple times in the initial instructions, it's in the Allen charge, I believe it was in the good faith instruction as well, and the jury expressed no confusion on this. I am not sure why we are injecting it into a charge which is explaining to the jury their responsibilities to deliberate.

THE COURT: I certainly understand that, but given that we are in sensitive territory, as *Thomas* and *Baker* make clear, and it's necessary to distinguish between somebody holding out because of a different view of the evidence, I think it does make sense to remind them. It certainly doesn't

do any harm and is an accurate statement of the law.

previously made, and I am reaffirming those now.

Mr. Avenatti, any comments on those proposed changes?

MR. AVENATTI: Well, obviously, your Honor, I want the record to be clear I am not waiving any objections I have

With that understanding, I am requesting that after the words "entirely with the government," that the instruction read, "that burden requires the government to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt." That is an accurate statement of the law and it goes hand in hand with the burden.

THE COURT: I don't think that's necessary.

Any other objection?

MR. AVENATTI: Further, your Honor, in light of the fact that the Court has overruled my objection to providing this charge to the jury in hard copy, I would ask that all of the instructions given to the jury be provided in hard copy at the same time. So that would be this charge, the *Allen* charge, and the good faith charge.

THE COURT: As I said, I am certainly open to that.

Mr. Podolsky.

MR. PODOLSKY: We have no objection to that.

THE COURT: All right. So I will modify the sentence that I read as well to read: "As well as the instructions I read to you yesterday in response to your first two notes. You should consider all of these instructions along with all of my

other instructions in reaching a verdict."

All right. Why don't we get the jury, and in the meantime I will try to get all these things printed.

(Jury present; time noted: 11:55 a.m.)

THE COURT: You may be seated.

Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning to you and thank you for being here on time to begin your deliberations this morning.

We have received your note, which reads as follows:

"We have one juror who is refusing to look at evidence and is acting on a feeling. We need assistance on moving forward.

She does not believe she needs to prove her side using evidence and refuses to show us how she has come to her conclusion.

Please help us move forward. Not going on any evidence, all emotions and does not understand this job of a jury."

At the beginning of this case, you each took an oath to well and truly try this issue and a true verdict give according to the law and the evidence.

Pursuant to that oath, each of you has a duty to deliberate. That entails a duty to consult with one another, to consider each other's views with an open mind, and to discuss the evidence with the objective of reaching a just verdict if you can do so.

Under your oath as jurors, you are not to be swayed by sympathy or emotion. You should be guided solely by the

evidence presented during the trial and the law as I gave it to you, without regard to the consequences of your decision. You have been chosen to try the issues of fact and reach a verdict on the basis of the evidence or lack of evidence. If you let sympathy or emotion interfere with your clear thinking, there is a risk that you will not arrive at a just verdict. You must make a fair and impartial decision so that you will arrive at a just verdict.

Your verdict must be based on the evidence introduced at trial or the lack of evidence. But I remind you the defendant has no burden to present any evidence. As I have told you many times, the burden of proof lies solely with the government.

As you deliberate, you should examine the questions put to you with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other. If, after listening to your fellow jurors, and if, after stating your own view, you become convinced that your view is wrong, do not hesitate because of stubbornness or pride to change your view. On the other hand, if you have honest convictions and beliefs based on the evidence presented at trial, you should not surrender those convictions and beliefs solely because of the opinions of your fellow jurors or because you are outnumbered.

I remind you that your verdict must be unanimous. Further, you are reminded that, if at any time you are not in

agreement, you are not to reveal the positions of the jurors, including a split of the vote, to anyone, including me, at any time during your deliberations.

With that, I will ask you to return to the jury room to continue your deliberations. I am going to give you copies of the instructions that I just read to you, as well as the instructions I read to you yesterday in response to your first two notes. You should consider all of these instructions along with all of my other instructions in reaching a verdict in this case. If, at any point in your deliberations, anyone on the jury is refusing to deliberate in accordance with my instructions, you are free to send us another note. And, of course, if you have any additional questions or concerns, you can always send us another note as well.

With that, I will have my deputy hand to Juror No. 1 the printed versions of the three instructions that I have given you, and you may retire and continue your deliberations. Thank you.

(Jury resumes deliberations)

THE COURT: You may be seated.

All right. Two other things while I have you.

First, while I declined the government's invitation to give a supplemental charge on good faith, as I think I made clear in my order, it may well be that an occasion arises where clarity or further clarity is appropriate. So I would

encourage you to think about that and keep an eye out for it.

I acknowledged that yesterday, but indicated my view that,
absent another note, it was likely somewhere between too late
and premature. I adhered to that position this morning in
ruling on the government's motion, but I am persuaded that
there may be some confusion on that issue; and so, if the
opening arises, based on further communications from the jury,
I think that that may well be warranted. So be prepared to
address that if or when it is appropriate.

Second, just one note on the defendant's other application for a mistrial this morning with respect to Ms. Daniels' interview. As I said, the application was frivolous. There is no suggestion that any juror is aware of it. I previously instructed them to disregard, avoid any news about the case, so on and so forth, and no reason to think they disregarded that. Moreover, there is no order in this case preventing witnesses from saying anything, and would draw your attention to local criminal rule 23.1 that addresses some of these issues.

Having said that, I would urge the government, I don't think you control Ms. Daniels per se, but she was a witness that you called, and to the extent that you have any capacity to influence her or speak to her counsel and urge her to be aware of the sensitivities involved in a deliberating jury, I think it would be behoove you to do so. Certainly, if she does

go on an interview tour, it raises the prospects of a juror learning about it, and that would certainly complicate things, and I think all of us, including Ms. Daniels, have an interest in avoiding a mistrial where we need to do this again. So that's my thought.

MR. PODOLSKY: We have made those efforts, your Honor, anticipating that issue. Certainly it's not something that we want to arise. I will note the defendant makes comments on this case almost every day to the press as he leaves the courtroom, and I don't think those are any better. So I think we should all be using our discretion in the way that we respond to press inquiries.

THE COURT: I would urge both sides to read local criminal rule 23.1, which does speak to these things and does apply to lawyers and parties involved in the case. So no one has made any application under that rule to me, no one has made a motion to enter an order that would restrict witnesses from making comments, so we are where we are, but you certainly should be aware of those rules and the obligations that they impose on both sides.

Yes, Mr. Avenatti.

MR. AVENATTI: Yes, your Honor. For the record, I have complied at all times with 23.1 and any suggestion to the contrary by the government is completely false. I have not commented on the evidence in this case, and I most certainly

have not commented on the jury deliberations. The interview that was given this morning was outrageous, frankly, in duration, accusations, and I understand the Court's ruling, I respect it, but no one that I have consulted in connection with this has ever seen anything like it, in a criminal case, to have the complainant go on national television and say what she said. I understand the Court's ruling.

I will also add that the government's complaints about what I have said, I have maintained my innocence in this case and I have repeatedly said that, and the last time I checked, the First Amendment allows me to do just so. As a criminal defendant, I am allowed to claim that I am innocent, which I have done and which I continue to plan on doing in connection with this case, your Honor.

application under rule 23.1. I am simply admonishing both sides to be mindful of the rule. I, for one, have not watched any interviews — I did watch Ms. Daniels' interview after it was brought to my attention this morning. I have not watched any of Mr. Avenatti's interviews, or whatever they may have been. So if there is an application, I will take it up, but I am really just urging you to make sure you're in compliance with the rule.

Anything at this time?

MR. PODOLSKY: No, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Avenatti. 2 MR. AVENATTI: No, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. If we get another note, I will 4 see you earlier. Otherwise, just a reminder that I will bring 5 them to the courtroom before I excuse them today, and that will 6 be at 4. So in that regard, you should certainly be here, if 7 we are not here earlier, by no later than 3:45, let's say, and ready to bring them up and excuse them for the day. 8 9 Thank you and I will see you when I see you. 10 (Recess pending verdict) 11 THE COURT: You may be seated. 12 All right. Government is here. Mr. Avenatti is here. 13 Standby counsel is here. 14 I think you have been advised of this, but I have a 15 note here, signed by the foreperson, dated today, at 2:33 p.m., stating, "We have a verdict." 16 17 We will get the jury up and have them return the verdict. I don't expect anything otherwise here, but obviously 18 just to underscore that I expect everybody to maintain decorum 19 20 and act professionally regardless of what the verdict is, and 21 then we will take it from there. 22 Anything that the government needs to raise? 23 MR. PODOLSKY: No, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Avenatti.

MR. AVENATTI: No, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Thank you. 2 (Jury present) 3 THE COURT: You may be seated. 4 Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. I understand from your 5 most recent note that you have reached a verdict. 6 Let me ask the foreperson, is that correct? 7 FOREPERSON: That is correct. THE COURT: Can you please hand the verdict form to 8 9 Ms. Smallman to hand to me. 10 All right. Members of the jury, I am about to read 11 your verdict, and after I do so, I intend to ask each of you, 12 is this your verdict? 13 In the matter of *United States v. Michael Avenatti*, 19 Cr. 374. 14 15 With respect to Count One, charging the defendant with wire fraud, the jury finds the defendant guilty. 16 17 With respect to Count Two, charging the defendant with aggravated identity theft, the jury finds the defendant guilty. 18 19 Signed by all 12 jurors, dated today, 2:32 p.m. 20 I will note for the record that it looks to me and I 21 gather that initially the other box was checked, but all of you 22 have initialed indicating that your verdict is guilty on each 23 count. 24 Let me confirm with each of you that that is correct 25 and that is your verdict.

| 1  | Juror No. 1, is that your verdict?             |
|----|--|
| 2  | JUROR: Yes, it is.                             |
| 3  | THE COURT: Juror No. 2, is that your verdict?  |
| 4  | JUROR: Yes, sir.                               |
| 5  | THE COURT: Juror No. 3, is that your verdict?  |
| 6  | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 7  | THE COURT: Juror No. 4, is that your verdict?  |
| 8  | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 9  | THE COURT: Juror No. 5, is that your verdict?  |
| 10 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 11 | THE COURT: Juror No. 6, is that your verdict?  |
| 12 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 13 | THE COURT: Juror No. 7, is that your verdict?  |
| 14 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 15 | THE COURT: Juror No. 8, is that your verdict?  |
| 16 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 17 | THE COURT: Juror No. 9, is that your verdict?  |
| 18 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 19 | THE COURT: Juror No. 10, is that your verdict? |
| 20 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 21 | THE COURT: Juror No. 11, is that your verdict? |
| 22 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 23 | THE COURT: Juror No. 12, is that your verdict? |
| 24 | JUROR: Yes.                                    |
| 25 | THE COURT: Jury is unanimous.                  |

Counsel and Mr. Avenatti, is there any reason I cannot dismiss the jury at this time?

MR. PODOLSKY: No, your Honor.

MR. AVENATTI: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is the moment where I will dismiss you and excuse you from jury service. I am not going to repeat my remarks from the other day since you heard them when I excused or let the alternates go, but let me reiterate my thanks to you. As I said the other day, all of us, the court and the system generally, thank you for your service, for your commitment, for taking time out of your busy lives and schedules to ensure that the system is fair and give a fair trial to both sides, and we all deeply appreciate that.

With your excusal from jury service, you are excused from complying with the rules that I have mentioned to you throughout this trial. Which is to say you are free to research the case, to Google the case, to read anything you want about the case. You are also free to talk to anyone you want about the case. I want to mention a couple of things in that regard.

First, given the nature of this case, it's fair to say that there is some press interest. It is up to you if you want to speak to the press, but I would strongly encourage you and urge you to think hard about whether you want to do that. If

you do that, I would strongly and firmly request that you respect the privacy of the jury's deliberations, that you talk about what happened in the courtroom, but you not talk about what happened in the jury room. In my view, that is between the 12 of you, and it should be kept private, you should respect the privacy of your fellow jurors and you shouldn't share that with anyone. So I would urge you to abide by that guidance.

I would also urge you not to necessarily speak to the parties — I am going to speak to them about that as well — should they wish to speak with you, again, for the same reasons. Your verdict is your verdict. What happened in the jury room happened among the 12 of you, and you should respect the privacy of that process. The jury system has served this country pretty amazingly well for over 230 years and there is a lot to be said for it. So I think a lot of respect for it is owed by you, by the press, and by the parties here.

With that, I thank you. I wish you a safe travel home. I wish you safe and wonderful weekends. You are excused from your jury service. And thank you very much. Stay safe and healthy.

(Jury excused)

THE COURT: You may be seated.

All right. First, with respect to the issue of contact with jurors, let me say that neither side is to contact

any juror without providing notice to the other side and getting permission from me. So you are not to do it, unless you have my permission and you have given notice to the other side.

I need to await Ms. Smallman to give a sentencing date.

What is the government's position on bail?

MR. PODOLSKY: Your Honor, we have discussed the matter with the defense and would jointly propose that the defendant surrender himself this coming Monday by 5 p.m. to the marshals in the Central District of California. We think based on the assurances that we have been provided by the defense and that agreement, we are comfortable with him staying out until that time, but no later.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Avenatti.

MR. AVENATTI: Agreed, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So I will order that Mr.

Avenatti surrender to the marshals in the Central District of California no later than 5 p.m. California time on Monday,

February 7.

As I said, I am awaiting Ms. Smallman, but since she seems to be occupied, let me give you a sentencing date myself.

I would put it down for Tuesday, May 24, at 3:45 p.m. Government.

MR. PODOLSKY: We are available, your Honor, and we think that date makes sense.

I do want to flag that based on what the defense has told us, there is a currently scheduled trial date in the Central District of California for May 10. They may be able to speak better to this. My understanding, however, is that there is a pending appeal out there and it's a little bit of anyone's guess as to whether that date will hold. So we would propose to stick with this date for now, although maybe the defense has a different view. But that would be our proposal.

THE COURT: Mr. Avenatti.

MR. AVENATTI: Your Honor, I am not opposed to that date at this time. The trial that is set in early May, it's unclear as to whether that's a firm date or not in light of the pending Ninth Circuit appeal, so I am certainly not opposed to the May 24th date.

THE COURT: For now I will put it down for May 24th at 4 p.m., subject to change, obviously, if that doesn't work for some reason. I am not going to interfere with a trial date in California. The parties should just advise me and we will adjust it accordingly.

I would assume that the government will be in touch with Ms. Clifford in the event that she wishes to submit something either in writing or to be heard. In accordance with her rights, you should certainly let her know, and let me know,

particularly if it may have a bearing on how long the proceeding may be. All right?

MR. PODOLSKY: We will, your Honor. We think that it is likely that she will wish to speak, and I am sure submit something, but we will be in touch and confirm with the Court so that you can be prepared.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else from the government?

MR. PODOLSKY: Not at this time, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else from Mr. Avenatti?

MR. AVENATTI: Yes, your Honor. I would like to reserve my Rule 29 motion and also have some additional time, 30 days, please.

THE COURT: I will give you 30 days to make any post-trial motions.

Any objection from the government?

MR. PODOLSKY: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. 30 days.

Question. Do you want to take a look at the jury verdict? I will be docketing it, but I will redact the jurors' signatures and also the initials that appear on page 1. I could also provide it to the parties by e-mail so that you have it, with the understanding that it's not for public release. The public version will have the redactions.

MR. PODOLSKY: That will be fine, your Honor.

```
M248AVEF
               THE COURT: Mr. Avenatti.
1
2
               MR. AVENATTI: Yes, your Honor. That's fine.
3
               THE COURT: Thank you very much. I wish everybody a
     pleasant weekend. Stay safe and healthy.
 4
5
               The matter is adjourned. Thank you.
6
               (Adjourned)
 7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```